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SHADES AND CONCEPTS* 




According to the conceptualist approach in the philosophy of perception, perceptual content is fully 
conceptual. Against this view, nonconceptualists argue that perceptual experiences have a fineness of 
grain that far outstrips what can be captured in terms of concepts possessed by the perceiver. They 
claim, for instance, that the number of colour shades we perceptually discriminate far exceeds the 
number of colour concepts we have or could have. Both McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999) 
acknowledge the fine-grainedness of perceptual experience and yet contend that it can perfectly be 
captured by concepts. According to them, the nonconceptualists’ argument rests on an unduly 
restrictive view of concepts as necessarily corresponding with entirely context-independent 
classifications of things. This amounts to restricting the concepts available to capture perceptual 
discriminations to those associated with verbal expression, which have context-independent norms of 
application. Once this restriction is lifted, it becomes possible for the conceptualist to argue that 
perceptual experience with all its fineness of grain can be fully captured by appropriate demonstrative 
concepts. Thus, the fact that a perceiver is capable of a perceptual discrimination between, say, two 
shades of red for which he lacks correspondingly different context-independent colour concepts 
does not make the content of his experience nonconceptual. It is perfectly possible for her to capture 
this difference in her perceptual experience of the two shades in terms of demonstrative concepts like 
coloured thus or this shade, that exploit the presence of samples of the shade in question. 
 For the conceptualist strategy to be successful it must meet two conditions of adequacy. 
First, it should be phenomenologically adequate, that is provide a satisfactory account of all aspects 
of the phenomenology of colour perception. Second, the strategy should also be conceptually 
adequate. In other words, the conceptualists should demonstrate that the purported demonstrative 
colour concepts (DCCs for short) they claim can capture the fine-grained content of colour 
experience satisfy central criteria of concepthood and hence really qualify as concepts. We will start 
with some preliminary remarks regarding phenomenology (section 1) but our main concern will be 
with the second condition of adequacy (sections 2 to 4). We will argue that DCCs fail to meet three 
related criteria for concepthood that form part of the conceptualist’s own conception of concepts. 
First, these purported concepts have implausible conditions of individuation and violate an intuitive 
Criterion of Difference for concepts. Second, there are no recognitional capacities associated to 
DCCs and as a consequence their inferential potential is severely restricted. Third, DCCs cannot 
play the role the conceptualists want them to play in the justification of judgements by perception. 
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Our conclusion will be that, as a consequence, we are left with no reason to admit that a judgement 
involving a DCC is really an exercise of a colour concept. 
 
1. Colour shades and demonstrative colour concepts 
 
One problem a conceptualist account of colour perception is confronted with is that colour 
indiscriminability is non-transitive. Colour samples a, b, and c can be found such that, for a normal 
observer, b is indiscriminable from a and c is indiscriminable from b and yet c is discriminable from 
a. As a result and as the conceptualists admit, the rule according to which two things fall under the 
same demonstrative colour concept if and only if they are indiscriminable in colour is incoherent. 
According to this rule, any coloured thing would fall under the DCC, for it is always possible to link 
the colour of that thing with that of the perceived sample through a chain of things each of which is 
indiscriminable in colour from its neighbours. This would entail that everything has the same colour! 
What the conceptualists claim, though, is that a different rule underlies the application of a DCC. 
Grasp of a DCC is provided by the perception of a coloured sample, and its extension comprises 
anything that is indiscriminable in colour from that sample (at the time of its perception) (McDowell, 
1994: 170sqq; Brewer, 1999: 174-5). Arguably, the latter rule, unlike the former one, does not 
suffer from incoherence. 
 It is worth considering two immediate implications of the new rule. First, as Brewer himself 
notes, any given thing is apt to fall under more than one DCC. Second, and conversely, a given DCC 
comprises in its extension things which are discriminable in colour. In the following table, Cx is the 
DCC which is grasped in perceiving a coloured thing x, and whose extension is described on the 
same line: 
 
Ca a b   
Cb a b c  
Cc  b c d 
Cd   c d 
 
Suppose for instance that b is some red thing perceived through a demonstrative concept Cb. 
With regard to the first implication, b falls under the concept Cb, since, trivially, it is indiscriminable 
from itself. But b is also indiscriminable from two other red things, namely a and c, hence also falls 
under both Ca and Cc. Conversely, with respect to the second implication, the concept Cb equally 
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characterises a and c, which are indiscriminable in colour from b, although they are discriminable 
from each other (they appear to have two different shades of red). 
This raises a difficulty, for isn’t it incoherent to suppose that a given thing, although uniformly 
coloured, presents more than one shade at a given time to a given observer? As McDowell (1994: 
56) puts it, a shade is less a band than a line on the spectrum. The relevant conception of a shade is 
roughly the one used by Russell (1921) and Goodman (1951), according to which two things x and 
y have the same shade (in given conditions) if and only if all things indiscriminable in colour from x 
are also indiscriminable in colour from y. Now colour shades, just as colours tout court, are mutually 
exclusive. As a uniformly coloured thing cannot be both red and green at the same time (in fixed 
conditions of observation), a given sample, say b, cannot have more than one shade at a given time 
(in fixed conditions of observation). 
From the conceptualists’ point of view, the proper response to this difficulty should be to 
concede that a DCC itself is not a concept of a colour shade, precisely because its extension is 
composed of things which have different shades. Moreover, the conceptualists can claim that there 
are circumstances in which Russell-Goodman shades are perceived as such. Suppose that the 
subject perceives three red things, say a, b and c, close together. The concept of the shade of b can 
be defined as the logical product of concepts Ca, Cb and Cc which, by hypothesis, are grasped by 
the subject. Under this concept neither a nor c but only b falls. The conceptualist can argue that the 
conceptual content of such an experience is sophisticated enough to allow the subject to perceive the 
exclusive shade of b. DCCs themselves do not slice the phenomenal world as finely as they should 
(they correspond to bands on the spectrum), but their logical products do. 
Of course, if there is only one sample around in the visual field, say b, its shade will 
necessarily be perceived in a somewhat indeterminate way. In such a situation, the concept Cb is (by 
hypothesis) grasped, but the concepts Ca and Cc themselves (and thus the relevant logical product) 
cannot be grasped, since this would require the perceptual presence of samples b and c. (More on 
this later.) This seems to imply that the introduction of a second sample, say a or c, in the visual field, 
changes the perceptual appearance of b, but it may be a conclusion that conceptualists can live with. 
So let us suppose – perhaps generously – that the conceptualists’ story about perception 
having a fully conceptual content is phenomenologically adequate, at least in the sense that it slices 
the phenomenal world finely enough. Moreover, we will continue to write, as the conceptualists do, 
as if a DCC is a concept of a colour shade, although we have just seen that this is not obvious. We 
now turn to our main concern, which is the conceptual adequacy of the conceptualists’ account. 
 
2. The individuation of demonstrative colour concepts 
 
According to a plausible Fregean Criterion of Difference, two concepts (considered as the senses of 
predicates) are different if the subject who grasps them at the same time can rationally adopt different 
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epistemic attitudes toward thoughts containing them (which are otherwise identical). For instance, if it 
is possible for a rational subject to believe (in a particular context) that everything which is thusa is 
thusa, where both tokens of ‘thusa’ express the same DCC grounded on the perception of a, while 
not believing that everything which is thusa is thusb, where the token ‘thusb’ expresses a DCC 
grounded on the perception of b, then the concept expressed by ‘thusa’ is not the same as the 
concept expressed as ‘thusb’. 
The Criterion of Difference for concepts implies that if a subject grasps two concepts at the 
same time, she is at least sometimes in a position to know that the concepts are different. That is, if 
she can rationally adopt different epistemic attitudes toward certain thoughts containing them, she 
knows that they are different. Note that this implication is compatible with the externalist view 
(accepted by McDowell) that we do not always know infallibly that we have really grasped a given 
concept, for here it is presupposed that the relevant DCCs are indeed grasped by the subject. 
Now suppose that the subject perceives two samples of the same colour shade – say, a1 and 
a2. It is natural to suppose that the DCCs grounded on the perception of these samples are the same. 
After all, not only do they seem to be coloured exactly alike, but they really have the same colour 
shade. However, it seems always possible for a rational subject to believe that everything which is 
thusa1 is thusa1, while doubting whether everything which is thusa1 is thusa2. For all she knows on the 
basis of perceptual appearance, there might be a sample which is indiscriminable from a2 but 
discriminable from a1. Such a sample would fall under thusa2 but not under thusa1. This is a coherent 
epistemic possibility, which implies, according to the Fregean criterion, that ‘thusa1’ and ‘thusa2’ 
express different concepts (in this context). 
If we accept the Criterion of Difference for concepts, then, it seems impossible to grasp the 
same DCC through the perception of numerically distinct objects which look exactly the same as far 
as their most specific colour is concerned. In fact, there is an infinite number of DCCs for a given 
shade, since they are necessarily tied to particular samples. So either conceptualists admit that there 
are conceptual differences in the contents of perception which do not correspond to any 
phenomenological differences, or they slice the phenomenal world too finely. Beside the fact that 
neither option is intrinsically plausible, the normal experience of perceiving internal 
relations between different shades presented at a given time (for instance, perceiving that 
two samples have exactly the same shade) has not been provided for. 
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3. Concepts, recognition and inference 
 
Another objection to the conceptualist strategy is that DCCs are not associated with any 
recognitional capacity. It seems plausible to suppose that mastery of an observational concept 
implies a capacity to identify and reidentify perceptual instances of the concept. This means that to 
have a concept of a given colour shade, one must be able to recognise coloured objects over time, 
not just to discriminate two simultaneously presented ones. McDowell acknowledges that possession 
of a concept presupposes a certain recognitional capacity. Indeed, he maintains that what ensures 
that ‘that shade’ can give expression to a concept of a shade “is that the associated capacity can 
persist into the future, if only for a short time, and that, having persisted, it can be used also in 
thoughts about what is by then the past, if only the recent past.” (1994: 57) Note though that this is 
an empirical claim for which McDowell adduces no evidence. For this claim to be falsified it would 
be enough to show that two shades of colour that are just over the threshold of perceptual 
discrimination when simultaneously presented would not be reliably discriminated if presented in 
succession. There is indeed plenty of empirical evidence that our capacity for perceptual 
discrimination far surpasses our capacity for perceptual identification and that colour is no exception. 
(Burns and Ward, 1977; Halsey and Chapanis, 1951; Hardin, 1988; Hurvich; 1981). Raffman 
(1995) drives the point most clearly. Obviously enough, one can recognize only what one can 
remember. Empirical evidence from psychophysics and perceptual psychology makes it clear that 
perceptual memory is limited and its grain much coarser than our perceptual discrimination 
thresholds. It follows that if concept possession requires a certain recognitional capacity, the maximal 
fineness of grain of our perceptual concepts will correspond to the maximal fineness of grain of 
perceptual memory encoding. It is overwhelmingly unlikely that DCCs meet this constraint and hence 
are associated with a recognitional capacity. 
 One possible move for the conceptualists is to claim that the recognitional capacity underlying 
the mastery of a DCC is not based on a memory image of the colour of the original sample 
(otherwise Raffman’s objection would be well-taken), but on the more general capacity to keep 
track of the sample itself. Suppose that a man tries to keep track of a sample of a given shade by 
always carrying it in his pocket. Could we say that he has a recognitional capacity insofar as it is 
always possible for him to compare this sample with coloured objects in his environment? No, 
because there is no guarantee that the colour of the sample will not at least slightly alter with time 
without him noticing the change. There is no such guarantee because there is no nomic relation 
between the property of the sample by means of which he keeps track of it and its shade property. 
Perhaps, he could defer to the opinion of a colour expert to know whether his sample has retained its 
original shade, but this would make his concept a deferential concept. We see nothing wrong with 
the idea of deferential concepts in itself, but surely it would be a reductio ad absurdum of the 
conceptualist's strategy if his only way of preserving the claim that the perceptual content is 
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conceptual were to reconstrue paradigmatically observational concepts such as shade concepts as 
socially deferential concepts.  
A more radical move the conceptualists could make would be to deny that a recognitional 
requirement should be imposed on DCCs. Yet there is a price to pay for this move and one may 
doubt whether it is worth paying. One important reason for insisting that concept possession requires 
an associated identification or recognition capacity has to do with the inferential role of concepts. 
Concepts are plausibly thought to be what accounts for the inferential powers of our beliefs and 
other propositional attitudes (Crane, 1992). In most cases, what explains the validity of an inference 
is the presence of certain conceptual constituents as parts as the content of the premises. To borrow 
an example from Crane, a thinker who believes that a is F and b is F and that a is not b will be 
disposed to believe that at least two things are F. What is essential for the inference to be valid is 
that the same part of the content should occur in the first two premises, in other words they should 
both contain the concept F. But suppose now that the relevant concepts are DCCs of the kind 
envisioned by Brewer and McDowell. In the absence of any genuine recognitional capacity 
associated with such concepts, how are we to ensure that the same demonstrative concept figures in 
both premises? The only case in which such insurance can be given is when the contents a is 
coloured thus and b is coloured thus are simultaneously available to the thinker in perceptual 
experience in such a way that he can attend to both at once. As soon as the two premises are 
obtained separately, the warrant disappears, since, for lack of recognitional capacity, the thinker will 
not be in a position to ascertain whether the demonstratives concepts involved in the two premises 
are the same or different. The inferential potential of such concepts is therefore extremely restricted. 
These concepts have neither past nor future and their use in reasoning is confined to the here and 
now of perceptual experience. The conceptualists may well be willing to bite the bullet. However, as 
we shall see in the next section, this limitation also casts a shadow on their main project, namely 
showing how perceptions can provide reasons for judgements and beliefs.  
 
4. Perceptual justification 
 
The conceptualists take the claim that perceptual content is conceptual to be a consequence of the 
fact that perceptual experiences can provide reasons for making certain judgements or holding 
certain beliefs. As Brewer explains, the connection between the two claims rests on two further 
premises. The first premise makes explicit the link between reasons and inference. It states that giving 
reasons involves identifying certain relevant propositions, namely those contents that figure as the 
premises and conclusions of inferences explicitly articulating the reasoning involved. The second 
premise states that reasons must be reasons for the subject, that is, they must be internal reasons that 
the subject should be able to register at the personal level and to appreciate as reasons. Our final 
worry is that the ephemeral character of the DCCs by means of which the conceptualist intends to 
capture the content of perceptual experiences makes the reasons provided by these experiences 
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equally ephemeral. Suppose, for instance, that a perceptual experience whose content is captured 
demonstratively, as the conceptualists suggest, as “that is (coloured) thus” provides a reason for 
making a certain judgement or holding a certain belief. How long does the judgement or belief remain 
justified by this reason? Given the lack of recognitional capacity associated with DCCs, the subject 
ceases to possess them as soon as his perceptual relation to the relevant samples breaks off. As a 
consequence, when the reason for a certain judgement or belief is a perceptual experience with a 
strongly context-dependent conceptual content, the judgement or belief retains its justification only as 
long as the perceptual experience in question is enjoyed. The problem is that here we cannot have a 
transition from a perception-based to a memory-based reason for a given judgement or belief. In 
certain conditions, if the initial reason a subject has for a certain judgement is his perception that p, 
this reason can evolve into a memory reason for the judgement. The subject now remembers that p 
or remembers having perceived that p. But one condition for the transition to occur is that the subject 
be able to entertain the thought that p both initially, at the moment of perception, and later, when he 
is remembering. This in turn requires that the concepts that are the constituents of the thought that p 
be possessed by the subject both at the time of perception and later when he his remembering. But 
this condition does not hold when the constituents of the content of the perceptual experience are 
strongly context-dependent DCCs. The weaker requirement that the subject simply remembers 
having had a perceptual reason for making a certain judgement, without necessarily now having the 
conceptual means to entertain a thought with the same content as the reason, does not suffice to 
guarantee that the judgement remains justified. The problem is that if one remembers having had a 
reason for making a certain judgement but cannot remember what the reason was since one has lost 
the concepts needed to articulate it, one will not always be in a position to recognize whether the 
newly presented evidence defeats one's initial reason for making the judgement. Suppose the reason 
a subject initially had for making a judgement was a perceptual experience with the content “a is 
thus1” and suppose he now has perceptual evidence that “a is thus2”. If he has not retained the 
capacity to think thoughts with the content “x is thus1”, he will not be in a position to recognize 




In this paper, we have put forward three main arguments against the claim that perceptual content is 
fully captured by demonstrative contents like “This is thus”. These arguments emphasise 
different facets of the same problem. Whereas the second argument shows that lack of 
diachronic recognition severely limits the inferential potential of demonstrative 
judgements, the first argument entails that even synchronic recognition is problematic; 
given the bizarre conditions of individuation of DCCs, a judgement that two coloured 
samples have exactly the same shade can never be perceptually justified. Finally, the third 
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argument stresses that even in cases where judgements involving DCCs are justified by 
perceptual experiences, the perceptual reasons last as long as the experiences do. 
 In conclusion, let us make clear that we have said nothing against the coherence of context-
dependent classifications. On the contrary, a judgement expressed by “That is thus” in a given 
context can have a fully conceptual content. What we have claimed is that although such a content is 
based on the perception of things and their qualities, it cannot substitute for the content of perceptual 
experience itself. The modes of presentation expressed by demonstrative predicates like ‘is thus’ 
cannot both satisfy the essential constraints on the individuation of concepts and capture the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience. So if experience has a content, it cannot be fully captured 




Brewer, B. 1999. Perception and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burns, E. M. and Ward, W. D. 1977. Categorical perception — phenomenon or epiphenomenon: 
Evidence from experiments in the perception of musical intervals. Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, 63, 456-68. 
Crane, T. 1992. The non-conceptual content of experience. In T. Crane (ed.) The Contents of 
Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136-157. 
Goodman, N. 1951. The Structure of Appearance. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Halsey, R. M. and Chapanis, A. 1951. Number of absolute identifiable hues. Journal of the 
Optical Society of America, 41, 1057-8. 
Hardin, C. L. 1988. Color for philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Hurvich, L. M. 1981. Color vision. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. 
McDowell, J. 1994 (second edition 1996). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Raffman, D. 1995. On the persistence of phenomenology. In T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious 
Experience. Thorverton: Schöningh /Imprint Academic. 
Russell, B. 1921. The Analysis of Mind. New-York: The Macmillan Company. 
 
